胡適 未完成的雕像 (夏菁 1963)
塑成永恆的微笑
春來時
它將如迎面的蒲公英
對你的塑像
尚待我們自心底完成
胡適 未完成的雕像
此詩寫於1963年2月22日 胡適逝世周年
『山』夏菁著 民國66年初版 台北: 純文學發行. 頁106-110
「洪業教授及其《史記三講》」等,才知道此書很耐讀,應多溫書。
洪先生;「視崔適如毒藥」。
童元方著(1996)《一樣花開》台北:爾雅叢書,1996
----The Warner-Lambert Co. manufactures and markets pharmaceutical, consumer health care, and confectionery products, including such popular brands as Listerine antiseptic mouthwash, Chiclets gum, Halls lozenges, Certs mints, Rolaids antacids, and Schick razors.
The product of a long history of mergers and acquisitions, the Warner-Lambert name reflects the combined assets of two businesses: the William R. Warner Company, a pharmaceutical and cosmetic concern, and Lambert-Pharmacal, manufacturers of Listerine oral antiseptic, which merged in the 1950s. Thereafter, Warner-Lambert became a large multinational corporation under the leadership of Elmer Holmes Bobst.
Bobst arrived at William R. Warner & Company in 1945, already a veteran executive of the pharmaceutical industry and a multimillionaire. As president of Hoffmann-La Roche's U.S. office, he had proved instrumental in acquiring for the Swiss company a large share of the U.S. drug market. Many observers were surprised that Bobst accepted the position at Warner; he was then 61 years old, wealthy, and could have settled into a comfortable retirement.
However, when Gustave A. Pfeiffer, Warner's chairperson and the only surviving member of the original founding family, approached Bobst with an offer of the presidency, he accepted. Nearly 30 years earlier, Bobst had been asked to join Warner as the head of its pharmaceutical division but declined when the Pfeiffer family refused to sell Bobst any of the company stock (the family held all the common stock). By the mid-1940s, however, Bobst had proved his abilities, and Pfeiffer readily offered the job on Bobst's terms; Bobst was hired and allowed to purchase 11 percent of the common stock. By 1955, Bobst's holdings were worth over $3 million.
What Bobst inherited with his new position was a family operated company suffering from an aging product line and antiquated facilities. Although Pfeiffer's 1916 acquisition of the Hudnut cosmetic line accounted for most of the company's $25 million sales, that product line was barely turning a profit. In an effort to improve the image of the cosmetics production, Bobst renamed the firm Warner-Hudnut in 1950.
Warner had a long history of growth through acquisition. Warner was founded in the mid-nineteenth century by William Warner, a Philadelphia pharmacist who had earned a fortune by inventing a sugar-coating for pills. In 1908, the company was acquired by the Gustavus A. Pfeiffer & Company, a patent medicine company from St. Louis. Pfeiffer retained the Warner company name, moved its headquarters to New York, and began a series of acquisitions that included the Hudnut line and the DuBarry cosmetic company. By the time Bobst assumed the presidency, some 50 companies had been acquired during the 99 years of the Warner company's history.
Bobst's managerial style was well suited to this company acquisition policy. Moreover, his experience with high-level industry and political affairs enabled him to hire a new management team of accomplished executives and public figures. Successful investment bankers, business executives, and political officials were brought in, notably Anna Rosenberg, the company's manager of industrial and public relations, who was once the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Alfred Driscoll, later Warner's president, who had served as governor of New Jersey for seven years.
In 1952, Bobst made his first major acquisition, purchasing New Jersey Chilcott Laboratories, Inc. Chilcott earned its reputation as a manufacturer of ethical drugs largely through its development of Peritrate, a long-acting "vasodilator," which enlarged constricted blood vessels. By 1966, an estimated 56 percent of 3.1 million people afflicted by heart disease used Peritrate. While the sales of the drug became Warner-Hudnut's mark of excellence in the pharmaceutical industry, its success was also cause for some controversy.
Peritrate proved useful in a wider application of treatments than originally allowed, and the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) approved of Peritrate's "new drug" usages in 1959. Over the next several years, however, Warner embarked on a controversial Peritrate advertising campaign. Appearing in several medical journals, including the Journal of the American Medical Association, ten page ads advocated the use of Peritrate not only for the treatment of angina, but as a "life-prolonging" prophylactic for all cardiac patients. The advertisement, based on the results of one study, was released at a time when the FDA had initiated an increasingly aggressive policy of evaluating claims for drug effectiveness. Even as the director of the study refuted the advertisement claims, Warner-Lambert executives stood by the claims for the effectiveness of their drug. However, by 1966, the government, under the directive of the FDA, seized a shipment of the drug, bringing charges against the company's unapproved advocacy of an even wider usage for the drug.
Also during this time, Bobst arranged a merger between his company and Lambert-Pharmacal. Bobst had met the president of Lambert, Edward Williams, at a meeting of the American Foundation for Pharmaceutical Education, and the two decided that their operations, each producing different but reputable products, would complement one another. Bobst was particularly interested in gaining access to Lambert's well-organized distribution network, which incorporated modern marketing techniques previously unavailable at Warner-Hudnut's. Furthermore, Williams brought a strong background in the management of pharmaceutical companies, enhancing Bobst's accomplished executive team, which had little experience in the pharmaceutical industry. When Warner and Lambert merged, former governor Alfred Driscoll was named president of the new company.
Lambert's Listerine product, which had accounted for over 50 percent of Lambert's total sales, guaranteed Warner a large share of the oral antiseptic market.Listerine was developed in the nineteenth century and became widely popular, particularly under the advertising strategy of Gordon Seagrove, who joined Lambert in 1926 after leaving his job as a Calliope-player in the circus. Seagrove made Listerine a household staple by promoting its ability to cure halitosis, sore throats, and dandruff. The advertising copy for one magazine ad depicted a man encouraging a woman to continue massaging Listerine into his head, with the tagline "Tear into it, Honey--It's Infectious Dandruff!"
Listerine continued to increase in popularity under its new ownership; by 1975, the oral antiseptic held a sizeable portion of the $300 million market. Warner-Lambert continued to invest heavily in advertising for Listerine. For years, Listerine had been advertised as a preventative measure against colds and sore throats, and, during the Asian flu epidemic of 1957, Bobst personally placed an ad in Life magazine promoting Listerine's ability to resist the sickness. The company's advertising agency had earlier rejected the ad, since its claims were unsubstantiated, but the promotion resulted in sales increases of $26 million for the year.
By 1975, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had begun to investigate the Listerine advertisements. The FTC disputed the cold prevention claims of Listerine as insupportable and ordered the company to embark on a disclaimer ad campaign amounting to $10 million, a figure equal to the company's average annual advertising expenditure between 1962 and 1972. The FTC argued that only corrective disclaimers could educate the consumer, and, in 1978, the Supreme Court upheld the FTC's order.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Warner-Lambert made several acquisitions, including Emerson Drug, which made Bromo-Seltzer, cough drop manufacturer Smith Brothers, American Optical, and Schick Shaving. To acquire American Chicle, makers of Chiclets chewing gum, Warner-Lambert used 7.8 million of its own stock, which was then worth about $200 million. Many industry analysts criticized the high price paid for American Chicle; in 1962, the company's net income for the year was under $10 million. By 1983, however, after expanding into foreign markets, Chiclet sales were reaching the $1 billion mark. Ward S. Hagan, chairperson of American Chicle, called its gum and mint business "the largest in the world."
Another merger during this time involved Parke, Davis & Co. However, Warner-Lambert's proposal to merge with Parke, Davis was investigated by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. According to the chair of the House Judiciary Committee, the merger would raise "serious problems" because it had the potential to limit competition and create a monopoly. Upon approval, the merger would result in a combined revenue of $1.7 billion and would rank the new company among the 100 largest industrial companies in the United States.
On November 12, 1970, the Justice Department announced it would not challenge the merger despite the Antitrust Division's recommendation to the contrary. The department referred the matter to the FTC, which held concurrent authority to enforce the Clayton Act. A day later, the merger was completed. By 1976, however, the FTC ordered the company to sell several units of its Parke, Davis subsidiary that produced specified drugs. Those units producing thyroid preparations, cough remedies, cough drops and lozenges, normal albumin serum, and tetanus immune globulin would have to be sold in order to restore competition in those product lines.
Satisfied with the FTC's actions, S. Burke Giblin, chair and chief executive officer of Warner-Lambert at the time of the ruling, nevertheless faced several other challenges in the ensuing years. In 1976, Warner-Lambert disclosed figures to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) concerning illegal payments abroad, announcing that more than $2.2 million "in questionable payments" had been uncovered in 14 of the 140 countries in which Warner-Lambert conducted business.
Only months later an explosion at an American Chicle plant in Queens, New York, killed six people and injured 55. After a year of investigation, a grand jury indicted the company and four of its officials on charges of reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. The charges were based on reports that the fire department had warned the company about the explosive potential of magnesium stearate dust used as a gum-machine lubricant. Contending that the charges were "outrageous" and unwarranted, company executives appealed the case. In 1978, a state judge dismissed the charges citing "crystal clear and voluminous evidence" that the company had tried to eliminate the danger of an explosion. The following year, however, the New York State court's appellate division voted to restore the indictments. Finally, in 1980, the state's highest court once again dismissed all charges in connection with the explosion.
Another controversy involved Warner-Lambert's Benylin cough syrup product, which was made available without a prescription in 1975. In response to questions regarding the cough syrup's effectiveness, the FDA ordered the drug back on a prescription-only status, and, after seven years of deliberation, a settlement was finally reached in which the FDA approved the reinstated over-the-counter sale of the drug.
In 1978, Warner-Lambert purchased Entenmann's Bakery for $243 million in cash. By 1982, Entenmann's had become Warner-Lambert's most profitable consumer division, with sales reaching $333 million and an annual growth rate of 19 percent. However, during this time, a rumor was started that Entenmann's profits were supporting Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church. Since the source of the rumor was said to come from Westchester county in New York, Warner-Lambert took out an ad in the county newspaper denying the alleged connection. Nevertheless, the rumor continued to circulate and actually received a large amount of publicity in the Boston, Massachusetts, area. It was reported in some places that Entenmann's delivery and sales staff were being harassed, and one Rhode Island church urged a boycott of the baked goods. When sales growth began to slip, Warner-Lambert mailed a letter to 1,600 churches in New England describing Entenmann's history as a family-owned business for 80 years before it was purchased. As Entenmann's profits continued to slip, Warner-Lambert sold the bakery to General Foods for $315 million in 1982.
The late 1970s had proved financially unstable for Warner-Lambert. Profit margins were off by 40 percent in 1979, the majority of revenues came from the sale of consumer goods, and the company was considered a potential takeover candidate. One critic characterized it a "floundering giant." That year, Ward S. Hagan replaced Bobst as chairperson, while Joseph D. Williams assumed the chief executive office. Hagan and Williams then embarked on a restructuring program with the goal of revitalizing the pharmaceutical operations and trimming unprofitable and non-core businesses.
Five unprofitable subsidiaries, including American Optical and Entenmann's, were divested between 1982 and 1986, providing Warner-Lambert with capital of nearly $600 million. At the same time, such company programs as the "Total Production System" aimed to increase productivity by cutting downtime, reducing paperwork, and creating a more flexible work environment. Hagan and Williams closed or consolidated 24 plants in foreign and domestic locations, while reducing the company labor force by almost half, from 61,000 to 32,000. Research for new drugs at the Parke, Davis division was supported by a 20 percent increase in budgetary funds during 1983 to $180 million.
Despite its improved financial condition, Warner-Lambert came under criticism, particularly for its 1982 purchase of IMED Corp., a small hospital supply manufacturer. Many found Warner-Lambert's $468 million purchase, 23 times IMED's earnings, exorbitant. IMED was the market leader, with 35 percent of sales in the hospital supply field and continued annual sales growth of 50 percent. However, the company was beset with problems. IMED's executives apparently concentrated on short-term sales goals, at the expense of new product development. In fact, a management conflict between IMED's manufacturing and research and development executives caused many important employees to resign in frustration. In 1986, Warner-Lambert sold IMED and some of its affiliates to The Henley Group, Inc. for $163.5 million.
Williams, who was given the additional duties of chairperson during Warner-Lambert's turnaround period, was able to report that return on equity had increased from nine to 32 percent from 1979 to 1986, as sales shrunk through divestments and profits held fairly steady. Investing in research and development, and luring industry talent from competing companies, Williams hoped to develop and increase sales of high-margin prescription drugs, such as Lopid, a cholesterol-reducing drug that received positive publicity in the late 1980s. However, a trend among consumers toward treatment without medication, as well as swelling support for reform of the health care industry--and the attendant possibility of price controls--caused uncertainty among ethical drug producers. Business was also threatened by a late 1980s recession and discounting in the consumer goods segment.
In anticipation of these potentially adverse market forces, a new chairperson and CEO, Melvin R. Goodes, announced yet another reorganization of Warner-Lambert late in 1991. The plan called for a 2,700-person layoff, reorganization of the global management scheme, and consolidation of operations into two groups: pharmaceuticals and consumer products. Goodes also began to concentrate the company's marketing efforts on three primary geographic markets: North America, Europe, and Japan. The company invested $1.3 billion in advertising and promotion and $473 million in research and development, apparently banking on its consumer goods, which still constituted 60 percent of annual sales in 1992.
That year, Warner-Lambert became the fourth company to enter the competitive and controversial market for transdermal nicotine patches. Its prescription smoking cessation device, branded Nicotrol, was strongly promoted through direct consumer advertising, and the product enjoyed early success. However, sales quickly declined in 1993; Warner-Lambert's late entry into the segment, chronic product shortages, a lower than expected success rate, side effects, and especially reports that some users had suffered heart attacks, all led to declines in sales.
In 1993, the company became the first to win approval from the FDA for a drug that retarded the progression of Alzheimer's disease. Warner-Lambert also formed joint ventures with Glaxo Holdings plc and Wellcome plc to orchestrate the movement of the companies' drugs from prescription to over-the-counter and generic markets.
Although still known for reporting some of the industry's lowest profit margins, Warner-Lambert enjoyed steadily increasing sales and profits from 1988 through 1992. Revenue grew from $3.91 billion to $5.6 billion, and profits nearly doubled from $340 million to $644 million during that period. While the consumer goods segment held out relatively low profits, it enjoyed strong international expansion in the late 1980s and early 1990s, helping Warner-Lambert offset some of the losses associated with its ethical drugs.
Principal Subsidiaries
Adams S. A.; American Chicle Co.; Chicle Adams, S. A.; Euronett, Inc.; Family Products Corp.; Keystone Cemurgic Corp.; Parke, Davis & Co.; Tabor Corp.; Warner-Chilcott Inc.
Further Reading
Baum, Laurie, "A Powerful Tonic for Warner-Lambert," Business Week, November 30, 1987, pp. 44, 146.
Lubove, Seth, "Failure Focuses the Mind," Forbes, November 8, 1993, pp. 76-78.
Starr, Cynthia, "First-Ever Alzheimer's Drug Brings Some Hope to Millions," Drug Topics, October 11, 1993, pp. 16-18.
Weber, Joseph, "Curing Warner-Lambert--Before It Gets Sick," Business Week, December 9, 1991, pp. 91, 94.
— Updated by April Dougal Gasbarre
2 Timothy 共 4 章
Dickinson College | |
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Motto | Latin: Pietate et doctrina tuta libertas |
Motto in English | Religion and learning, the bulwark of liberty |
Established | 1783 |
Type | Private liberal arts college |
Endowment | $271 million[1] |
President | William G. Durden |
Academic staff | 210 |
Undergraduates | 2,300 |
Location | Carlisle, PA, USA |
Campus | Suburban 170 acres (68 hectares) |
Colors | Red and White |
Nickname | Red Devils |
Website | http://www.dickinson.edu/ |
Dickinson College is a private, residential liberal arts college in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.[2] Originally established as a Grammar School in 1773, Dickinson was chartered September 9, 1783, five days after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, making it the first college to be founded in the newly-recognized United States. Dickinson was founded by Benjamin Rush, a signer of the United States Declaration of Independence and named in honor of a signer of the Constitution, John Dickinson, who was later the President of Pennsylvania. Dickinson College is America's 16th oldest college.
With over 180 full-time faculty members and an enrollment of nearly 2,400 students, Dickinson is known for its curriculum and international education programs. Dickinson sponsors 12 study centers in other countries and its approach to global education has received national recognition from the American Council on Education and NAFSA: Association of International Educators.[3][4] The college was among six institutions profiled in depth by NAFSA for "Outstanding Campus Internationalization" in 2003 [5] The 42% acceptance rate for the Class of 2011 is Dickinson's lowest ever, and the College's nearly 6,000 applications put it amongst the top liberal arts colleges nationwide. In 2007 Dickinson's endowment topped $300 million, more than double its total from ten years before.[6]
Dickinson College is not to be confused with the Dickinson School of Law, which abuts the campus but has not been associated with the college since the late 19th century. The law school merged with Pennsylvania State University in 1997, and its students study at both the Carlisle and State College campuses. Dickinson is sometimes mistaken for, yet has no relation to, Fairleigh Dickinson University, a private university in the state of New Jersey.
Bib ID | 2068272 | ||
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Format | Book | ||
Author |
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Description | Macau : Imprensa Nacional, 1949. 24 p. ; 25 cm. | ||
Notes | At head of title: Instituto Portugues de Hongkong, Seccao de Historia. |
1940年2月,他離開閩南神學院,帶著全家到北平,在燕京大學宗教學院開始譯經工作——把新約聖經由希腊文直接翻譯為中文。除了翻譯聖經之外,他還在宗教學院教授希腊文的課程。1941年太平洋戰爭爆發後,燕京關門,全家移居北平城內。當時生活極為艱困,幸得王克私教授(Dr. Philippe de Vargas)多方籌措,接濟扶助,使他仍能繼續安心致力於翻譯工作。1945年秋,日本投降,燕大復校,他回到燕京大學。1946年6月24日,「呂譯新約初稿」由燕京大學宗教學院出版,僅印500本,非賣品,獻於新約學者,廣徵意見和批評或提示,以便再事修改。
《眾樹歌唱》增訂版導讀 柯慶明
梁啟超提倡新小說,胡適提倡新文學之際,他們心目中都以西洋的近代文學為典範;他們相信其中所顯現的近代世界的生活感知,足以引領在文明上落後的中國, 至少在精神意識上,能夠更加快速的進入近現代的文明境域。但是當胡適在〈建設的文學革命論〉,主張應該:「趕緊多多的繙譯西洋的文學名著,做我們的模 範。」時,他並沒有明白意識到:如何繙譯?繙譯是採直譯?意譯?繙譯的語言風格,作品的形式、結構等等的問題。
但對大多數的寫作者而 言,若他們透過譯作來學習,則他們的「模範」,其實並不是「西洋的文學名著」本身,他們學習的並不僅是原作的主題思維,經驗歷程,同時更是譯作呈現的語言 質地、結構形式與美感情趣所形成的整體藝術風格。即使譯者盡力求取其譯作趨近原作,譯作仍是與原作不同:不同的文化傳統,歷史經驗與語言情韻所形成的獨特 語言表現與接受體驗等等,都使得兩種語言之間必然有著無法完全跨越的鴻溝;更重要的,即使不談譯作必然是建立在對原作的特殊解讀、詮釋之上,因而未必能夠 精準或全面的掌握原作的多層、多方的意涵與素質;譯者個人的生存情境與才性學識,亦自有其積習而成的特殊語言風格,這自為原作者所不知;但卻成了譯作的讀 者所直接經驗的對象。因而,當嚴復以「信、達、雅」三者討論譯事:「信」固然是力求不誤讀、不扭曲,所以區別「繙譯」與「創作」的基本要求,但「達」、 「雅」之間,其實反映的卻是譯者對自身文字風格的斟酌與考量。
因而新文學的「模範」其實是眾多的西洋文學的「譯作」,它本身有因襲、有 創 造,但卻都成了別人學習的典範。因而說:這些繙譯創造了新文學的作品形式與內容意識,或許亦不為過。就以作品形式而言,在諸多的嘗試之餘,小說或許採取了 「減法」,減去了章回的回目與回內呼應對仗回目的故事結構,減去了說話人的口吻與論說,以至引詩、評點等傳統舊習。詩則顯然在放棄了以中國舊詩體之「以中 詩譯西詩」的嘗試後,(少時曾見分別以五言、七言、樂府與楚騷等舊體詩繙譯Samuel Taylor Coleridge的The Rime of the Ancient Mariner的合集,此書已無法尋索,僅記得楚騷體的譯者就是胡適),採取了加法:分行、分節。漸以白話繙譯詩意,但仍力求押韻、節與節之句數一致,更 要求字數,或調整句內的音節,至少是音節數的勻整等等……這種各類音律的考量,都曾有多方嘗試,它們未必形成通用的體式;但分行、分節,語句詩意之跨行連 結,形成戲劇性的對比……則已了新詩以至現代詩的通用表現形式。.....
.......幸虧他修了夏德教授(Frederich Hirth)的漢學(Sinology)課程,我們今天才聽到「丁龍 Dean Lung」這個名字。夏德教授是「丁龍講座」設立後的第一位「講座教授」。丁龍是中國人,不知道他是姓丁名龍,還是姓龍名丁。他是美國將軍卡本迪(Horace W. Carpentier, 1825-1918)的僕人,丁龍勤勞誠實,深得主人信賴。在丁龍退休時,將軍給了他兩萬元美金作退休金。
丁龍將這兩萬元捐給哥倫比亞大學,成立了一個「漢學講座」,作為研究中國文化之用。卡本迪將軍知到了這件事,他把錢湊足為十萬美元,而成立了這個講座。.......
2)From Mia Anderer
在一份名为Memoirs of H. A. Giles的资料上,Dean Lung后面所附的汉字清清楚楚地写着“天龙”,这就推翻了 Dean Lung是姓+名的说法,而是一个常见的中国人的双名。米亚据此大胆推测,1905年的高尔威统计报告中Dean Ding的Ding应该是Dean Lung的姓氏,Dean Lung的中文名字很可能就是“丁天龙”。H.A.Giles有Dean Lung的资料,是因为当时为了庆祝Dean Lung Chair of Chinese的设立,Herbert Allen Giles曾受邀于1902年3月在哥大做了一篇题为"China and the Chinese"的演讲:
The following Lectures were delivered during March, 1902, at Columbia University, in the city of New York, to inaugurate the foundation by General Horace W. Carpentier of the Dean Lung Chair of Chinese....
HERBERT A. GILES.
Cambridge, England, April 15, 1902.
【记录】丁龙的中文名字
最近二十年胡適著述之出版
時間:2003年9月19日 作者:楊早 來源:中華讀書報
歐陽無畏 (1913~1991),原籍江西興同。1930年畢業於東北馮庸大學政治系,1933年,任教青海第一師範,因地緣對佛教和藏文發生興趣,在青海組「藏 文研究會」,與友人合編《藏文字典》,但因文稿遺失而未出版。1937年於拉薩哲蚌寺(hBras-sPungs)剃度出家,法名君庇亟美。首期七年,修 習因明、般若、中觀等重要大論。後自拉薩出發,進行藏尼之旅,隨後又祕密完成大旺的調查報告。
歐陽氏共在西藏生活達十八年,離藏後即在重慶中央大學和政治學校教授藏文,並擔任訓導工,抗 戰勝利後又擔任國防部邊務研究所藏文教席。1948年再度入藏,修習顯密教法。1951年底,獲堪布告知被選為格魯派(dGe-lugs-pa)最高學位 「拉然巴格西」的候選人,但當時中共在西藏已是箭拔弩張,於是歐陽在還未進行辯經考試前,即越藏印邊境,輾轉抵達台灣。
來台灣後,1955年任「光復大陸設計委員會」的委員兼祕書,研究「中印國界」問題。1956年始,才受聘任政大邊政所(現為民族所),任藏學教席,講授藏文、西藏歷史、地理、文化等科。後多所研究所的藏文課程,皆聘請歐陽擔任教席。
自1975年退休起,歐陽在家中自設絳帳,依藏文原典,按照拉薩格魯派三大寺五部大論的教育學程,除了有系統地教授藏文外,循次第講授「印度佛教史」、「西藏佛教史」、「基礎因明」(rTags-rigs,攝類學、心類學、因類學等三學)、「宗 義」(Grub-mtha')、「般若」(Phar-phyin)、「中觀」(bBuma)、「量論」(Tshad-ma)等藏學重要論著,並不收學費, 以默默培養藏學後繼者為一生的職志。至1991年,喇嘛猶受聘法光佛研所。為「西藏佛學組」的指導教授,直至去世為止。今日台灣有能力和志業從事藏文、藏 學研究的後起之秀,多出於君庇亟美喇嘛的門下,對於引導藏傳顯宗經典的翻譯和研讀的功勞極大。