War Torn 關於美國是否應該參加「二戰」的激烈爭論；2016.12. 安倍晉三在珍珠港悼念戰爭死難者

The New York Times Chinese -Traditional 紐約時報中文網

1941年12月7日，週日下午，紐約需要盡快得到所有可能得到的消息。時報正是在那裡廣播了關於日本襲擊珍珠港的若干最早報導，美國從此陷入戰爭。

76年前，我們在電波中的初次登場幾乎可說趕上了最好的時機。
（#時報內情——《紐約時報》新聞背後的故事）

1941年，《紐約時報》在電波中報導珍珠港事件

《紐約時報》涉足廣播的歷史很悠久，1941年12月1日，時報的正點新聞簡訊節目首播。六天後，珍珠港事件爆發，時報第一時間在電波中報導了那個改變歷史的時刻。

CN.NYTSTYLE.COM

「我向那些在這裡犧牲的人的靈魂，以及那些被一場在這裡發起的戰爭奪去生命的勇敢的男男女女，和無數淪為這場戰爭受害者的無辜民眾的靈魂，致以我真誠、永恆的哀悼。」

「我們永遠不能讓可怕的戰爭再次上演。」

週二，日本首相安倍晉三在75年前襲擊珍珠港的現場和歐巴馬總統相鄰而站。安倍表示了悔悟，但沒有道歉。

安倍晉三在珍珠港悼念戰爭死難者

安倍晉三與歐巴馬一道訪問珍珠港。他對犧牲者、戰爭受害者「致以我真誠、永恆的哀悼」，但沒有道歉。75年前的突襲造成美國2400人喪生，並將美國拖入二戰。

CN.NYTSTYLE.COM

胡適出使美國的戰略，就是等待美國對日宣戰。本篇的續集......

閱讀

關於美國是否應該參加「二戰」的激烈爭論

JACOB HEILBRUNN 2013年08月13日

Barry Blitt

針對美國是否應該參加二戰的激烈爭論在歷史上十分精彩，其激烈程度遠遠超過針對麥卡錫主義和越戰的辯論。

1939年7月，富蘭克林·D·羅斯福(Franklin D. Roosevelt)在白宮會見兩黨的參議員，為勸說他們修改《中立法案》(Neutrality Act)做最後的努力。該法案禁止美國幫助其他國家。酒杯斟滿之後，羅斯福和國務卿科德爾·赫爾(Cordell Hull)極力論證世界將爆發災難性的戰爭。

74歲的共和党參議員威廉·博拉(William Borah)厭惡地搖了搖頭，1919年他曾領導了反對伍德羅·威爾遜(Woodrow Wilson)以及美國加入國際聯盟的鬥爭。「歐洲今年不會爆發任何戰爭，」他說，「所有這種歇斯底里都是人為製造出來的。」兩個月後希特拉進攻波蘭，英 國和法國宣布對德作戰。

如今「二戰」被認為是最偉大的一代人進行的正義戰爭，所以 針對是否應該參戰的激烈爭論也被大多數人遺忘了。但是反對美國干涉他國的遊說團體的故事不僅在歷史上十分精彩，也與今天美國是否應該介入他國事務的爭論遙 相呼應。菲利普·羅斯(Philip Roth)聲稱是歷史學家小亞瑟·施萊辛格(Arthur Schlesinger Jr.)的回憶錄啟發他創作了小說《反美陰謀》(The Plot Against America)。這部小說虛構了查爾斯·林德伯格(Charles Lindbergh)領導的孤立主義者打敗羅斯福當選總統的情形。施萊辛格回憶說關於是否應該參加「二戰」的那場辯論是「我一生中最激烈的政治辯論」，其激烈程度遠遠超過針對麥卡錫主義和「越戰」的辯論。

• 檢視大圖
  Topical Press Agency/Getty Images
  1939年10月12日，羅斯福總統就《中立法案》向全國講話。

這場辯論主要源於對「一戰」結果的失望：威爾遜所承諾的民 主戰爭最後淪為懲罰性的《凡爾賽和約》(Treaty of Versailles)。主要的自由主義歷史學家哈利·埃爾默·巴爾內斯(Harry Elmer Barnes)和查爾斯·比爾德(Charles Beard)都曾大力支持威爾遜介入「一戰」的決定，後來也轉而開始譴責。《哈佛克里姆森報》(The Harvard Crimson)在社論中宣稱：「我們拒絕參與另一場權力平衡的戰爭。」1939年約瑟夫·斯大林(Joseph Stalin)與納粹德國簽訂互不侵犯條約之後，美國的共產黨也忠順地聽從莫斯科的旨意，譴責羅斯福是個好戰分子。

與此同時，一些參議員也反對幫助「英國富豪」擺脫困境，其中包括傑拉爾德·P·奈(Gerald P. Nye)，他帶頭對「一戰」軍火製造商（「死亡販子」）進行調查。另外，亨利·福特(Henry Ford)、約瑟夫·P·肯尼迪(Joseph P. Kennedy)和林德伯格等綏靖分子呼籲美國與可憐的、被誤解的納粹合作。《華爾街日報》在1940年6月的社論中呼籲人們「現實一點」，辯稱希特拉 「已經決定了至少未來一代人的時間裡未來生活的大方向」。儘管美國共產黨讚美以蘇聯為主的國家取得的進步，但是右翼綏靖主義者認為希特拉的法西斯主義是未 來一股不可阻擋的潮流，同時又譴責羅斯福的新政是極權主義。

琳內·奧爾森(Lynne Olson)的《那些憤怒的日子》(Those Angry Days)和蘇珊·鄧恩(Susan Dunn)的《1940》有力地重現了那個黑暗的年代。奧爾森曾是《巴爾的摩太陽報》駐白宮的通訊記者，出版過關於英國和「二戰」的幾本書。鄧恩是威廉姆 斯學院人文學科的教授。奧爾森以引人入勝的細節描繪了羅斯福政府和孤立主義運動之間的鬥爭中的關鍵人物。她認為羅斯福在挑戰國會方面太過懦弱，但是孤立主 義者的熱情和深度暗示着一個更能讓人理解的結論。羅斯福沒有逃避衝突，而是巧妙運籌，抓住機會推動美國參戰，就像他跟溫斯頓·丘吉爾(Winston Churchill)說的那樣，自己在耐心等待着終結這場辯論的重大危機。鄧恩精彩地講述了1940年羅斯福和溫德爾·威爾基(Wendell Willkie)之間的選戰。羅斯福當時在爭取史無前例的第三個任期，威爾基是國際主義共和黨人。

最後卻是威爾基，而非其他共和黨人，開始質疑該黨對孤立主 義的擁護，但這發生在大選結束之後。當時他經羅斯福同意去英國考察，很快被《芝加哥論壇報》激進的孤立主義出版人羅伯特·麥考密克上校(Col. Robert McCormick)譴責為「共和黨內奸」。讓極端保守的共和黨人驚愕的是，威爾基是因為極力支持置身局外而獲得提名的。但是成為候選人之後，他開始避免 正面回答關於干涉主義的問題。鄧恩表明，羅斯福也是如此。

奧爾森令人信服地證明羅斯福從1937年最高法院改組計劃 的失敗（帶頭反對的是蒙大拿民主党參議員伯頓·K·惠勒[Burton K. Wheeler]）以及1938年國會選舉的失敗中吸取了教訓：他永遠無法征服民意。奧爾森還提到陸軍、海軍和空軍的很多高級軍官蓄意破壞羅斯福的計劃， 「就在珍珠港事件之前，空軍司令哈·阿諾德(Hap Arnold)涉嫌泄露政府的一項最高軍事機密——對德全面戰爭的應急計劃」。

在參議院，正是惠勒譴責羅斯福在英國單獨對德作戰時試圖適度幫助英國。1940年羅斯福支持徵兵法案時，惠勒特別憤怒：「如果這個法案通過了，那它將扼殺最後一個偉大的民主國家——那將是給予希特拉的最大的、代價最小的勝利。」像美國母親會(Congress of American Mothers)這樣的右翼組織的成員來到華盛頓，身着黑衣，對執拗的立法者尖叫、吐口水，懸掛參議員克勞德·佩珀(Claude Pepper)的肖像，肖像中的佩珀戴着一個綬帶，上面寫着克勞德·「貝內迪克特·阿諾德」·佩珀（貝內迪克特·阿諾德是美國獨立戰爭時期的一個將軍，後向英軍叛變——譯註）。

奧爾森指出，有幾個傑出的市民組織成功地開展了反對孤立主 義者的運動，包括紐約世紀聯合會(New York』s Century Association)的成員，他們自稱「百夫長」(Centurions)。這些組織中的知名人士由律師格倫維爾·克拉克(Grenville Clark)領導，與羅斯福政府有着密切聯繫。1940年6月，克拉克說服共和黨國務活動家、干涉主義者亨利·斯廷森(Henry Stimson)加入羅斯福的內閣，任戰爭部長。另外，共和黨人、《芝加哥每日新聞報》的出版人弗蘭克·諾克斯(Frank Knox)任海軍部長。在共和黨的全國大會上，他們兩個被開除出黨。

讓羅斯福最惱火的對手是林德伯格。他把自己塑造成冷靜、沉 着的現實主義者，讓美國觀眾相信英國註定要失敗，美國別無選擇，只能迎合第三帝國。但是1941年9月在得梅因市的「美國第一」(America First)集會上，他無意中透露了自己的真實想法，宣稱美國真正的敵人是國內的猶太人——「他們對這個國家最大的威脅在於他們擁有的大量財富以及對美國 電影業、出版業、電台和政府的影響力。」

「二戰」之後，右翼繼續尋找在國內搞破壞的機會。保守派之 前批評羅斯福努力阻擾納粹，現在抱怨他對共產黨叛徒太過仁慈。但是就像施萊辛格1952年在《大西洋月刊》上發表的文章《新孤立主義》(The New Isolationism)闡釋的那樣，類似參議員羅伯特·塔夫托(Robert Taft)和約瑟夫·麥卡錫(Joseph McCarthy)這樣的人物其實是在通過支持國內的政治迫害來掩飾自己對國外軍事干涉所缺乏的熱情。很可能，什麼歷史描述都趕不上菲利普·羅斯在《反美陰謀》中對孤立主義這種毒藥的描述。但是奧爾森和鄧恩可貴地提醒我們：羅斯福做對了。假如他當時猶豫了，結果會大不一樣。羅斯福拯救了西方文明，使它抵擋住了前所未有的重大威脅，他做出的貢獻不比丘吉爾少。

本文作者Jacob Heilbrunn是《書評》的固定撰稿人，也是《國家利益》(The National Interest)雜誌的編輯。
本文最初發表於2013年7月28日。
翻譯：王艷

War Torn

By JACOB HEILBRUNN August 13, 2013

Barry Blitt

In July 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt met with senators from both political parties at the White House in a final effort to persuade them to amend the Neutrality Act preventing America from aiding other countries. After drinks were poured, Roosevelt and his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, argued that the world was approaching a catastrophic war. The 74-year-old Republican senator William Borah, who had led the fight against Woodrow Wilson and American entry into the League of Nations in 1919, shook his head in disgust. “There is not going to be any war in Europe this year,” he said. “All this hysteria is manufactured and artificial.” Two months later Hitler invaded Poland, and England and France declared war on Germany.

Now that it has become the good war fought by the greatest generation, the ferocity of the disputes over entering World War II has largely been forgotten. But the story of America’s anti-­interventionist lobby is not only historically fascinating, it also echoes in debates today over whether America should engage abroad or hold back. The historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. — whose memoir, Philip Roth said, inspired his novel “The Plot Against America,” about an alternative reality where the isolationists, led by Charles Lindbergh, defeat Roose­velt for the presidency — recalled the dispute as the “most savage political debate in my lifetime,” eclipsing those over McCarthyism and Vietnam in its intensity.

• 查看大图
  Topical Press Agency/Getty Images
  President Roosevelt addresses the nation about the Neutrality Act, Oct. 12, 1939.

The debate was largely rooted in disappointment over the outcome of World War I, when Wilson’s promised crusade for democracy ended with the punitive Treaty of Versailles. Leading liberal historians like Harry Elmer Barnes and Charles Beard, both of whom had noisily championed Wilson’s decision to intervene, now denounced it. The Harvard Crimson declared in an editorial, “We refuse to fight another balance-of-power war.” And after Joseph Stalin signed a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany in 1939, American Communists obediently heeded Moscow and denounced Roose­velt as a warmonger.

At the same time, senators like Gerald P. Nye, who had headed an investigation into the munitions manufacturers of World War I (“merchants of death”), attacked the idea of bailing out “British plutocrats.” What’s more, appeasers like Henry Ford, Joseph P. Kennedy and Lindbergh called for cooperation with the poor misunderstood Nazis, while The Wall Street Journal pleaded for “realism” in a June 1940 editorial, arguing that Hitler had “already determined the broad lines of our national life for at least another generation.” Just as American Communists hailed the progress represented by the Soviet Union, so appeasers on the right saw Hitler’s fascism as the inevitable wave of the future, even as they denounced Roosevelt’s New Deal totalitarianism.

“Those Angry Days,” by Lynne Olson, a former White House correspondent for The Baltimore Sun and the author of several books on England and World War II, and “1940,” by Susan Dunn, a professor of humanities at Williams College, powerfully recreate this tenebrous era. Olson captures in spellbinding detail the key figures in the battle between the Roosevelt administration and the isolationist movement. She maintains that the president was too timorous in challenging Congress, but the fervor and depth of isolationist sentiment suggest a more sympathetic verdict. Far from shirking the conflict, Roosevelt played his cards well, seizing upon events to nudge the country toward war and patiently waiting, as he told Winston Churchill, for the big crisis that would settle the debate. Dunn superbly depicts the 1940 election between Roosevelt, who was seeking an unprecedented third term, and his internationalist Republican opponent, Wendell Willkie.

It was Willkie, more than any other Republican politician, who ended up challenging the party’s embrace of isolationism, but this did not really occur until after the election, when he traveled to Britain with Roosevelt’s approval and was promptly denounced as a “Republican Quisling” by Col. Robert McCormick, the rabidly isolationist publisher of The Chicago Tribune. To the consternation of mossback Republicans, Willkie had captured the nomination by riding a groundswell of enthusiasm for an outsider. As a candidate, however, he began to hedge on interventionism. So, Dunn shows, did Roosevelt.

Olson argues persuasively that Roose­velt drew a lesson from his failed Supreme Court packing scheme in 1937 (the opposition to it was spearheaded by Senator Burton K. Wheeler, the Montana Democrat) and his inability to defeat Republicans in the 1938 Congressional elections: he could never get ahead of public opinion. Olson also reports that numerous high-ranking officers in the Army, Navy and Army Air Corps sought to sabotage Roosevelt and that “just before Pearl Harbor, Hap Arnold, the Air Corps chief of staff, was implicated in the leak of one of the administration’s most closely guarded military secrets — a contingency plan for all-out war against Germany.”

In the Senate it was none other than Wheeler who denounced Roosevelt’s modest attempts to keep Britain afloat as it single-handedly battled Germany. When Roose­velt backed a bill for conscription in 1940, Wheeler was apoplectic: “If this bill passes, it will slit the throat of the last great democracy still living — it will accord to Hitler his greatest and cheapest victory.” Members of right-wing groups like the Congress of American Mothers traveled to Washington dressed in black to scream and spit at recalcitrant legislators and hang an effigy of Senator Claude Pepper wearing a sash inscribed with the words claude “benedict arnold” pepper.

Olson shows that the campaign against the isolationists was successfully waged by several prominent citizens’ groups, including members of New York’s Century Association, who called themselves “Centurions.” These establishment worthies, led by the lawyer Grenville Clark, enjoyed close contacts in the Roosevelt administration. Clark persuaded the Republican statesman and interventionist Henry Stimson to join Roose­velt’s cabinet in June 1940 as secretary of war. In addition, Frank Knox, a Republican and the publisher of The Chicago Daily News, joined as secretary of the Navy. Both were drummed out of the Republican Party at its national convention.

The most nettlesome antagonist Roose­velt faced was Lindbergh. He presented himself as a cool and dispassionate realist, assuring his American audiences that England was doomed and that there was no choice but to cozy up to the Third Reich. But he tipped his hand at an America First rally in September 1941 in Des Moines, when he announced that the real enemy was internal and Jewish — “their greatest danger to this country lies in their large ownership and influence in our motion pictures, our press, our radio and our government.”

After World War II, the right continued to search for internal subversion. Having previously flayed Roosevelt for trying to stop Nazism, conservatives now complained that he had been too soft on Communist traitors. But as Schlesinger showed in a 1952 article in The Atlantic titled “The New Isolationism,” figures like Senators Robert Taft and Joseph McCarthy were really trying to camouflage their lack of enthusiasm for military intervention abroad by endorsing witch hunts at home. Probably no historical account can match the skill with which Philip Roth evokes this isolationist witches’ brew in “The Plot Against America.” But as Olson and Dunn valuably remind us, Roosevelt got it right. Had he wavered, events could have turned out very differently. No less than Churchill, Roosevelt saved Western civilization from the greatest menace it has ever known.

Jacob Heilbrunn, a regular contributor to the Book Review, is editor of The National Interest.