2026年5月7日 星期四

胡適代表Peking University(北京大學)參加1936年 哈佛300周年慶..... 童元方2026。 1944年12月7日哈佛大學: HU SPEAKS ON CHINA PUZZLE Communist Faction Lagging Claims Former Ambassador

 

近來心事向劍橋,遊蕩在腦海中的校園,想起了哈佛300周年,也就是1936年,中國哈佛校友會送給學校的一座紀念碑,由一隻烏龜馱著。兩年前我又看到它,卻多了雙語的說明,我順手把它拍了下來。
也許是我的職業病罷,看到中文版說當時參加校慶的胡適代表燕京大學,簡直豈有此理!英文版的Peking University指的是北京大學,才是正確的。
我想起洪業在他的史記講稿裡提到過這件事。這講稿原爲英文,中文是我譯的,題曰:《洪業教授及其史記三講》,收在爾雅出版的《一樣花開》中。因爲故事有趣,容我把相關的部分抄在下面:
「也許更重要的是,中國的大學教育始於漢武帝。我記得哈佛三百周年校慶時,有來自世界各地的賀客繞校一周的儀式。因爲安排繞校一周時各校代表出場先後的次序,而發生了問題。當時胡適代表北京大學,吳文藻代表燕京大學。他們翻檢過去的紀錄,要找出究竟哪個大學創立得比較早,則由那個大學的代表領先出場。燕大號稱他們是在1889年,爲紐約州所特許成立的;而北大則創立於民國肇始(1912年)以後。如此說來,燕京自然較早,所以胡先生必須在吳先生之後出場。其實,胡先生才應該走在前面,因爲北京大學是由成立於西元前的、武帝的太學一脈相傳下來的」。
在這兒我補充兩句。吳文藻是社會學家,他的夫人冰心可能更爲人所知。結果當年領頭的是埃及的大學代表。至於胡適的字在碑文裡其實不必寫,若要寫,也應該是「字適之」,而不是後來棄用的「希疆」。唉!真是!
更好玩的是,我在校時經歷了350周年的校慶,當時的貴賓是現在的英王查理三世,那時是查理王子。


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關於《胡適之先生年譜長編初稿-補編》,我看到鍾漢清老師已經在用補編的資料了,解釋胡適先生論三民主義,解釋胡適先生論該打屁股。欣見補編資料被引用。有興趣的朋友可移步鍾漢清老師的部落格「胡適之先生的世界」

hc我對"為什麼刪"有興趣。有的,想不出來,譬如說,1959年3月4日的"中午,應孔德成的宴會。"
1944年度只刪9月的一行:"九月起,先生應哈佛大學之聘。 (趙元任1968.4.15復編者的信)"

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根據胡適日記,1944.12.7,他的談話有段他想留給後世的:
中國的戰爭問題是一個在科學與技術上毫無準備的國家,對上軍事產業都是一流的日本。這一問題在起初的七年半都沒改變。直到過去3年中國取得西方的援助,才有所改變。日本更是打從一開始就全心讓中國無法取得西方的援助。 (我的簡略翻譯)
哈佛大學的刊物The Harvard Crimson 隔天即有所報導:對老美而言,中國內部的共產黨抗日說法和史迪威將軍與蔣介石失和的故事,都是老外很有興趣的。此文可了解胡適認為共產黨的抗日論是誇大的,不實的.....史迪威將軍事件,外人都還不清楚。

HU SPEAKS ON CHINA PUZZLE

Communist Faction Lagging Claims Former Ambassador


Hu Shih, professor of Chinese Thought, addressed a group of 50 in the Lowell House Junior Common Room Wednesday night, in a speech sponsored by the International Club, the Harvard Liberal Union, and the Postwar Council.
Admitting the power of the Communist Party in China, and its threat to the Chungking Government, he asserted that the Communists' fight against Japan was not all that it should have been. "How could the Japs," he asked, "have made such great gains in China if the Communist armies had done all that they claim to have done?"
Professor Hu based the ability of China to withstand the ravages of war for almost eight years on four main factors. These are China's vast superiority to Japan in quantity of land and manpower, its intense national patriotism, and its firm belief that the forces of good must eventually overcome those of evil.
On the question of General Stilwell's return, Professor Hu pleaded ignorance, adding that the few who knew couldn't say. He closed his address by pointing out that China's need for aid was greater than ever and urged even closer Chinese-American relations.





























******胡先生後來的想法


China in Stalin's Grand Strategy By Hu Shih, October 1950 Issue
American aid and arms for the Communists in China never materialized. Even President Roosevelt's attempt in 1944 to place General Joseph W. Stilwell in command, under Chiang Kai-shek, of all Chinese forces, "including the Communist forces," did not succeed. The President had said to Chiang Kai-shek: "When the enemy is pressing us toward possible disaster, it appears unsound to reject the aid of anyone who will kill Japanese." But Chiang Kai-shek was opposed to it. His position was supported by the American Ambassador, Patrick J. Hurley. So General Stilwell was recalled. The Chinese Red Army remained poorly armed and ill-equipped. It remained a guerrilla force of great mobility and skill, but as late as the last year of the war, it had not attained the stature of an established army that could face the Japanese enemy or the Government forces in open battles.